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I. Introduction 
On September 11, 2001, nineteen Muslims from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates hijacked several commercial 
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airliners and crashed them into the World Trade Center and Pentagon.  
2,996 people were killed.1  Less than a week later, President George W. 
Bush visited the Islamic Center of Washington, D.C. Bush came to the 
Islamic Center to meet with Muslim-American leaders and provide an 
important message to the American people. “Acts of violence against 
innocents violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith,” Bush 
explained. “[I]t’s important for my fellow Americans to understand 
that . . . . The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That’s not what 
Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don’t represent peace. 
They represent evil and war.”2 
Despite President Bush’s message that day, as the facts of 9/11 
materialized and the “War on Terror” began, the American public’s per-
ception of Islam took an unfortunate shape. Over the next decade, the terms 
“jihad,” “al-Qaeda,” and “radical Islam” entered the American vernacular. 
In addition, horrific stories of radical Islamic religious practices such as 
“honor-killings” and the “stoning” of Muslim women were broadcast over 
American television. Unsurprisingly, the American public began to ques-
tion who this new enemy was. Were we simply at war with al-Qaeda? Or 
was there a fundamental conflict between Islam and the American way of 
life? 
Over the past year, a movement that classifies Islam, or more specific-
ally, “Shari’a,”3  as a threat to the United States has offered hyperbolic 
answers to these questions.4  More and more, various anti-Muslim groups 
                                                                                                     
 1. See THE 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE 
U.S. chap. 7, 215−53 (2004) available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911 
Report.pdf. An additional plane, United Airlines Flight 93, was also hijacked by four al-
Qaeda terrorists (detailing the assembly and training of the terrorists involved in the attack). 
During the hijacking, some of the passengers attempted to regain control of the plane. The 
plane ultimately crashed into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania killing all 40 people 
aboard plus the hijackers. Id. at 10−14.  
 2. See President George W. Bush, Address at the Islamic Center of Washington 
(Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/terrorism/july-dec01 
/bush_speech_ 9-17.html. (responding to the American animosity towards Islamic-American 
citizens following the September 11 attacks). 
 3. See Asifa Quraishi, Who Says Shari’a Demands the Stoning of Women? A 
Description of Islamic Law and Constitutionalism, 1 BERK. J. OF MIDDLE EASTERN & 
ISLAMIC L.J. 163 (2008) (explaining the concept of shari’a and its interaction with American 
constitutionalism). Shari’a literally means “way” or “street;” in essence, it refers to the 
divine way that God expects Muslims to live. In other words, Sharia is simply a way of life 
that Muslims believe has been mandated by God through the Quran and the Prophet 
Muhammad’s example. Id. at 164.  
 4. See generally Wajahat Ali et al., FEAR, INC.:  THE ROOTS OF THE ISLAMOPHOBIA 
NETWORK IN AMERICA, Center for American Progress (August 2011) available at 
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have begun to identify Sharia as a “legal-political-military” doctrine that 
seeks to infiltrate the American judicial system and impose a radical brand 
of Sharia law in the United States.5  Sadly, while this view has a minute 
relation to reality, the rhetoric and fear are gaining attention among national 
politicians and in state legislatures across the country. To date, twenty-five 
state legislatures have debated or are currently considering bills that would 
forbid state judges from considering Sharia law in their decisions.6  While 
the legislators in each state are unique, the legislation and the arguments all 
share a common theme: a belief that Muslim-Americans are a “monolithic” 
and subversive threat to the United States and its way of life. Muslims, the 
argument goes, have a singular loyalty to their religion—a religion that 
preaches intolerance and violence and advances the notion that the aim of 
all Muslims is to build a global “caliphate” that subjects all persons to Islam 
and Islamic law. 
As this note hopes to illustrate, though such arguments could be 
viewed as mere political embellishments, at times of national crisis similar 
claims have been successfully advanced towards minority groups in the 
United States. In World War II, with the support of the American public, 
the Roosevelt administration pointed to military necessity and a subversive 
Japanese threat as cause for interning over one hundred thousand Japanese-
Americans in camps along the West Coast.7  Similarly, just over a decade 
later, the Truman Administration and the U.S. Congress swept the nation 
into a fury over the threat of a Communist Party takeover.8  At that time, 
                                                                                                     
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/pdf/islamophobia.pdf. 
 5. See THE CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, SHARIA:  THE THREAT TO AMERICA 11, 6 
(2010), available at http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/documents/Shariah_The_Threat 
_to_America_(Team_B_II_Report)_9-14-10.pdf. [hereinafter CENTER FOR SECURITY 
POLICY] (stating that the United States faces an “insidious ideological threat:  the totalitarian 
socio-political doctrine that Islam calls shariah”). 
 6. See Ashby Jones & Joe Palazzolo, States Target Foreign Law, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, Feb. 7, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204662204577 
199372686077412.html (“Twenty-one states are considering measures that would prohibit 
judges from applying the laws or legal codes of other nations in a wide variety of cases. 
Three states—Tennessee, Louisiana and Arizona—recently added versions of such laws to 
the books, while a fourth—Oklahoma—worked a similar change into its constitution in 
2010.”). 
 7. See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (“We cannot say that the war-
making branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour 
such persons could not readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a 
menace to the national defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate 
measures be taken to guard against it.”) (quoting Hirabayahshi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 99 
(1943)). 
 8. See ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM:  A BRIEF HISTORY WITH 
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government leaders and the American public were convinced that American 
“Communist party members were . . . part of a secret conspiracy, fanatics 
who would automatically do whatever Stalin told them to do.”9  In each of 
these episodes, the American government took unprecedented steps to 
challenge a perceived threat to the American way of life, and in each case 
the Supreme Court upheld the government’s actions.10 
Today, the same arguments that led to the Japanese-American intern-
ments and the Red Scare are being directed towards the Muslim-American 
community. Citing disloyalty, a disparate set of values, and a monolithic 
community of saboteurs, anti-Muslim activists and organizations are ad-
vocating for radical, yet not unprecedented, measures to isolate Muslims 
and halt “stealth jihad.”11  This Note will seek to compare the arguments 
being advanced by anti-Muslim activists today with the anti-Japanese and 
anti-Communist arguments of the past. Part II will briefly explore what 
Sharia is and is not and, in so doing, seek to explain the “threat” that anti-
Muslim groups and politicians have identified. Parts III and IV will then 
illustrate the rise of the anti-Sharia movement in the United States and the 
legislation that has appeared in states like Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
Oklahoma and Tennessee. Next, Parts V and VI will respectively introduce 
how similar arguments and legislative initiatives were directed towards 
Japanese-Americans during World War II and American Communists and 
liberals during the Cold War. Part VII will then look at how the Supreme 
Court addressed and upheld the decisions that were made during World 
War II and the Cold War and, additionally, offer a brief discussion of where 
current jurisprudence lies. Finally, this Note will seek to dispel the belief 
that Sharia poses a threat to the American judicial system and argue that as 
a policy going forward, Muslim-American integration should be decoupled 
                                                                                                     
DOCUMENTS 21 (Lynn Hunt et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2002) (“The sense of urgency that surrounded 
the issue of communism came from the U.S. government’s attempt to mobilize public 
opinion for the cold war . . . . Above all, it legitimated the McCarthy era repression by 
dehumanizing American Communists and transforming them into ideological out- 
laws . . . .”). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Jones & Palazzolo, supra note 6 (outlining the recent trend to demand keeping 
foreign laws out of consideration in American courts); Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951) 
(convicting petitioners of violating the Smith Act, which outlaws conspiracy to overthrow 
the government). 
 11. See CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 5 at 8 (“Those who today support 
shariah and the establishment of a global Islamic state (caliphate) are perforce supporting 
objectives that are incompatible with the U.S. Constitution, the civil rights the Constitution 
guarantees and the representative, accountable government it authorizes.”). 
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from the “security” umbrella and, instead, become rooted in a social and 
civil rights endeavor that recognizes Muslim-Americans essential 
“American-ness” and desire for acceptance. 
II. Sharia Law:  Myths and Realities 
Over the past decade, there has rightfully been an unremitting devotion 
by scholars to explain Sharia law and the Islamic faith.12  Most of these 
works provide excellent descriptions and insights into how Sharia is 
practiced in the U.S. and abroad. Still, the sheer number of books and 
articles on Sharia and Islam is perhaps indicative of the subject’s com-
plexity. While the following description will come short of providing a full 
representation of Islam, for our purposes it should provide an adequate 
illustration of Islam’s core teachings and values. 
At the foundation of Islam are five pillars:  belief in God,13  ritual 
prayers,14  fasting,15  the hajj (i.e. pilgrimage),16  and charity.17  Sharia is 
essentially concerned with the observance and practice of these pillars.18  
From the most literal of standpoints, Sharia is defined as “the path or the 
way.”19  Similarly, in the religious context, it is said to be “the way God is 
asking people to behave and to live.”20 
Though it is often described to the contrary, Sharia is not a clear and 
articulate body of law. More precisely, “[it] is a path to 
religion . . . primarily concerned with a set of values that are essential to 
Islam and the best manner of their protection.”21  There are generally 
thought to be two tangible sources for Sharia:  the Qu’ran, which Islam 
teaches to be the word of God, and the sunna, a biography of the Prophet 
                                                                                                     
 12. For example, a WestLaw search of law review or journal articles with “Sharia” or 
“Shariah” in the title yields a result of over 2,100 articles written within the past ten years. 
 13. MOHAMMED HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI’AH LAW:  AN INTRODUCTION 2 (2008). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Surat Al-Mā’idah 5:48: (“To each among you have We prescribed a law and an 
open way.”) (translating from Arabic). 
 20. See Quraishi, supra note 3, at 164 (explaining how Sharia law and the Islamic 
religion developed). 
 21. See KAMALI, supra note 13, at 2. (giving general information about Sharia law). 
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Mohammed.22  Out of the sunna comes the “hadith”—teachings that 
provide more “concrete details . . . [of] what the Prophet has done or said, 
or even tacitly approved . . . .”23  Naturally, while the Qur’an and sunna 
cover many subjects, these sources do not provide answers to all of life’s 
questions. In turn, when faced with questions that the Qur’an or sunna do 
not clearly answer, Muslims turn to religious scholars and leaders to 
interpret the texts and provide a conclusion. This interpretive work—
“ijtihad”—is, in fact, quite similar to the work that lawyers and judges do. 
In essence, these religious “jurists” are being asked to answer specific legal 
questions—as they relate to one person’s situation—based upon the 
interpretation of existing rules. 
It is through the differing and occasional inexplicable interpretations 
of the Qu’ran and sunna that controversy often arises. In certain Islamic 
societies and nations across the world, Muslim leaders have used the guise 
of the Qu’ran to promote abhorrent laws and policies. As many scholars 
have noted, however, many of these shocking interpretations have little, if 
any, basis in the Qu’ran.24  As the Islamic scholar Wael Hallaq has ex-
plained, in its original form Sharia was not meant to apply equally to all 
people. On the contrary, Sharia recognized that “individuals were 
not . . . indistinguishable members of a generic species, standing in perfect 
parity before a blind lady of justice. Each individual and circumstance was 
deemed unique, requiring ijtihad that was context-specific.”25  Following 
the end of colonialism, however, Islamic political leaders in the Middle 
East and Africa soon began to use the language of the Qu’ran and sunna to 
promote political objectives.26  Sadly, this politicization has transformed 
Sharia “from a worldly institution and culture to a textuality, namely, a 
body of texts that is entirely stripped of its social and sociological 
context . . . .”27  Though scholars note that the “study of Sharia should not 
be approached in the expectation of finding a comprehensive or systematic 
                                                                                                     
 22. See id. (detailing where Sharia law is drawn from).  
 23. WAEL B. HALLAQ, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 16 (2009). 
 24. See CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 5, at 6. (stating that even though the 
Center for Security Policy, an anti-Sharia group, ignores this idea in making their final 
argument, the group initially concedes that among most of the world’s Muslim, Sharia is just 
“a reference point for a Muslim’s personal conduct, not a corpus to be imposed on the life of 
a pluralistic society”). 
 25. See HALLAQ, supra note 23, at 166. 
 26. See id. at 167−68. (discussing changes and transformational forces such as 
centralization, codification, homogenization, and militarization were all in fact “props of the 
modern state project” that led to a view of Sharia that was detached from its past). 
 27. Id. at 167. 
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code or codes that present definitive answers to precise legal issues of the 
day,”28  many Islamic states and political leaders have attempted to do just 
that. In the process, “the very meaning of Islamic law [has been] severely 
curtailed, if not transformed, having been emptied of the content and 
expertise necessary for genuine evaluation of Shari’a-on-the-ground, and of 
its operation within an ‘ecological’ system of checks and balances.”29 
The Sharia that has arisen in certain Islamic states has paved the way 
for draconian laws and policies that offend Western notions of equality and 
pluralism. Moreover, it has led to the conspiracy theorists and anti-Muslim 
notions that this strict, yet false, form of Sharia will be brought to the 
United States and forced upon Americans. Undoubtedly, world events and 
public statements from radical Muslim groups such as the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, Hamas, and al-Qaeda have fueled the notion that Islam is an 
incompatible and violent religion. Nevertheless, polling appears to suggest 
that over the past decade, this fear of Islam has spread and increasingly 
Americans are looking towards their Muslim-American neighbors as 
outsiders who share different values and hold seditious goals. 
III. The War on Terror and the Rise of the Anti-Sharia Movement 
In the wake of 9/11, the pattern of terrorism and the military threat to 
the United States seemed too obvious for many Americans to ignore. After 
all, on 9/11 nineteen Muslims attacked the United States and within a short 
time, the U.S. was in conflicts in Muslim nations against an enemy that 
pointed to Islamic teachings as their justification for war.30  Yet over time, 
as the day-to-day scenes from the warfronts in Iraq and Afghanistan faded 
from the headlines, what was once an outward fear of terrorism began to 
shift inward towards domestic Muslim-American communities. Increas-
ingly, Americans began to wonder if, in addition to an external security 
threat, Islamic and Muslim-Americans posed a danger from within.31 
                                                                                                     
 28. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, Shari’a in the Secular State:  A Paradox of Separ- 
ation and Conflation, in THE LAW APPLIED:  CONTEXTUALIZING THE ISLAMIC SHARI’A 321, 
321 (Peri Bearman et al. eds., 2008). 
 29. HALLAQ, supra note 23, at 168. 
 30. See THE 9/11 COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 215−53 (explaining the 9/11 
attacks and subsequent actions by the United States). 
 31. See PUBLIC RELIGION RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Majority Say Congressional Hearings 
on Alleged Extremism in American Muslim Community ‘Good Idea’ (2011) available at http: 
//publicreligion.org/research/2011/02/majority-say-congressional-hearings-on-alleged-ext 
remism-in-american-muslim-community-%E2%80%98good-idea%E2%80%99/ (“A plural 
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Today, this fear has reached a tipping point. Opinions of Islam within 
the U.S. are now at their lowest point ever.32  The Pew Research Center 
reports that the percentage of Americans with favorable views of Islam has 
dropped from forty-one percent to thirty percent in the past five years.33  
Additionally, there is now a growing sense amongst Americans that Islam 
has an inherent anti-American message and that Muslims are inherently un-
American and disloyal. According to a recent report by Ohio State and 
Cornell University, only fifty-two percent of Americans believe that 
Muslims in the United States are supportive of the United States and only 
thirty-three percent believe that Muslims are “trustworthy.”34  Similarly, a 
sizeable proportion of Americans now believe that Muslims should be 
barred from running for President or sitting on the Supreme Court.35 
Undoubtedly, the turn in anti-Muslim attitudes can be traced in large 
part to world events and the threat of terrorism. Nevertheless, in the decade 
since 9/11, there has been a corresponding rise in anti-Muslim organ-
izations that promote the view that the greatest threat to America comes not 
from al-Qaeda or foreign terrorists, but from your Muslim-American 
neighbor. The Center for American Progress recently released an extensive 
report that explained how organizations such as the American Public Policy 
Alliance, Jihad Watch, ACT! for America, and Stop Islamization of 
America have garnered over $40 million in donations over the past ten 
years and have helped spread the notion of “an Islamic conspiracy to 
destroy ‘American values.’”36 
                                                                                                     
ity (46%) of Americans believe that American Muslims have not done enough to oppose 
extremism in their communities.”). 
 32. See THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, RELIGIOUS PERCEPTIONS IN AMERICA (2010), 
available at http://www.abudhabigallupcenter.com/143762/Religious-Perceptions-America. 
aspx (“Fifty-three percent of Americans say their opinion of Islam is either ‘not too 
favorable’ (22%) or ‘not favorable at all’ (31%)”.). 
 33. See OMAR SACIRBEY, Muslims In America Divided On Improving Image 10 Years 
After 9/11, HUFFINGTON POST, July 24, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08 
/24/muslim-america_n_935685.html (stating that despite learning more about the Muslim 
faith, Americans seem to be turning against it more strongly). 
 34. See CORNELL UNIVERSITY SURVEY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE “BIN LADEN” 
EFFECT:  HOW AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT MUSLIM-AMERICANS SHIFTED IN THE WAKE 
OF OSAMA BIN LADEN’S DEATH 3 (2011), available at http://www.sri.cornell.edu/sri/files 
/binladen_report.pdf (describing the anti-Muslim sentiment amongst a large number of 
Americans). 
 35. See Alex Altman, Time Poll:  Majority Oppose Mosque, Many Distrust Muslims, 
TIME MAGAZINE, Aug. 19, 2010, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8 
599,2011799,00.html (quantifying the animosity towards the Muslim-American comm- 
unity). 
 36. See Ali et al., supra note 4, at 2 (describing several organizations that are 
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At the forefront of this campaign has been the Center for Security 
Policy. Its report, “Shariah:  The Threat to America,” has become the corn-
erstone publication for the anti-Sharia movement. In it, the authors con-
clude that “America is engaged in existential conflict with foes that have 
succeeded brilliantly in concealing their true identity and very dangerous 
capabilities.”37  These enemies, the report adds, “adhere to an all-encom-
passing Islamic political-military-legal doctrine known as shariah. It obliges 
them to engage in jihad to achieve the triumph of Islam worldwide through 
the establishment of a global Islamic state . . . .”38 
The report calls on Americans to resist the urge to welcome Muslims 
into their communities as the United States has done in the past with other 
minority groups or “Noble Savages.” For the authors, 
There is a crucial difference in the contemporary incarnation of this 
‘Noble Savage Other,’ however:  Where the Other of yesteryear used to 
live vividly imagined, if dimly understood, in the Western imagination, 
the contemporary Other now lives, quite literally, in the West itself. 
Indeed, a massive demographic shift has brought adherents to shariah—
a doctrine that, by definition, opposes all others—deep into the non-
Islamic world. The Other is still vividly imagined, if dimly understood. 
But where he once provided intellectuals with a theoretical foil against 
modernity, the Other—in this century, in the collective form of prac-
titioners of shariah—now manifests itself as a concrete bloc.39 
The segment of American society that the Center for Security Policy 
and anti-Sharia activists identify as being particularly vulnerable to the 
“Muslim threat” is the American judicial system. According to this 
argument, “based on shariah’s tenets, its core attributes . . . and its bid for 
supremacy over all other legal or political system, there can be no 
confusion on this score: . . . shariah is an enemy of the United States 
Constitution. The two are incompatible.”40  Americans, in turn, must 
awaken to the reality that “the United States has been infiltrated and deeply 
influenced by an enemy within that is openly determined to replace the U.S. 
Constitution with shariah.”41 
                                                                                                     
dedicated to the undermining of Muslim-Americans). 
 37. CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 5, at 11. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 127. 
 40. Id. at 123. 
 41. Id. at 13. 
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An example that has frequently been underlined as an illustration of 
this growing danger is a New Jersey criminal court case from late 2009.42  
The case gained national attention after the trial court judge acquitted the 
defendant, a Muslim man who had admitted to beating and raping his 
wife.43  The husband claimed that under Islamic law, he was allowed to 
have sex with his wife whenever he demanded.44  Accepting this defense, 
the trial court judge found that that the husband's religious belief necess-
arily eliminated his “intent.”45  While this bizarre and egregious ruling was 
immediately overturned by an appeals court,46  anti-Sharia critics pounced 
on the trial court’s decision as an example of Muslims attempting to usurp 
the American judicial system and impose Sharia law on American 
society.47 
Similar arguments have now taken hold among national political 
leaders. Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives 
and Republican presidential candidate, recently warned that “Sharia is a 
mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United States and in the 
world as we know it.”48  According to Gingrich, “Sharia in its natural form 
has principles and punishments totally abhorrent to the Western world.”49  
Similar arguments have come from conservative leaders such as former 
                                                                                                     
 42. See S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 422 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2010) (holding that 
“[d]efendant’s conduct in engaging in nonconsensual sexual intercourse was unquestionably 
knowing, regardless of his view that his religion permitted him to act as he did”). 
 43. See id. at 421 (“The trial judge found as a fact that defendant committed conduct 
that constituted a sexual assault and criminal sexual contact, but that defendant did not have 
the requisite criminal intent in doing so.”). See also Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988 (Md. 
App. 1996) (interpreting American law by affirming the use of Pakistani law). 
 44. See id. at 416 (“Plaintiff testified that defendant always told her:  ‘this is according 
to our religion. You are my wife, I c[an] do anything to you. The woman, she should submit 
and do anything I ask her to do.’”). 
 45. See id. at 418 (“After acknowledging that this was a case in which religious 
custom clashed with the law, and that under the law, plaintiff had a right to refuse 
defendant’s advances, the judge found that defendant did not act with a criminal intent when 
he repeatedly insisted upon intercourse, despite plaintiff’s contrary wishes.”). 
 46. See id. at 421 (“The trial judge found as a fact that defendant committed conduct 
that constituted a sexual assault and criminal sexual contact, but that defendant did not have 
the requisite criminal intent in doing so. His conclusion in this respect cannot be 
sustained.”). 
 47. See CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY, supra note 5, at 18 (emphasizing that while the 
case was overturned, “the fact that such a reversal was necessary is frighteningly 
instructive”). 
 48. Newt Gingrich, Address at the Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol’y Research 
Symposium:  Am. at Risk: Camus, Nat’l Sec. and Afghanistan (July 29, 2010). 
 49. Id. 
A MONOLITHIC THREAT 193 
Senator Rick Santorum, Rep. Michelle Bachmann (R-MN), Rep. Peter King 
(R-NY) and Herman Cain.50  All have stressed a common message:  Islam 
and Sharia are adverse to American values and Muslims are a subversive 
threat to the United States. 
IV. The Anti-Sharia Movement within State Legislatures 
With public opinion of Islam now at historic lows, it is perhaps un-
surprising that politicians have begun to promote legislation that exploits 
these views. The breadth and spread of the anti-Sharia movement has been 
extraordinary. Today, twenty-five state legislatures have proposed and 
debated legislation that would forbid judges, state officials, or in some 
cases even citizens from observing Sharia.51  Predictably, the drive behind 
the legislation is rooted in the same anti-Sharia organizations and activists 
noted above. Leading the way is the American Public Policy Alliance 
(“APPA”) and its model legislation entitled American Law for American 
Courts (“ALAC”). The APPA warns, 
“One of the greatest threats to American values and liberties today 
comes from abroad, including foreign laws and foreign legal doctrines 
which have been infiltrating our court system at the municipal, state and 
federal levels . . . . Examples include “conflict-of-law” issues with 
foreign law, including many countries that have Shariah-centric legal 
systems . . . . APPA focuses on countering this infiltration of anti-
Constitutional laws across a broad variety of initiatives.52 
Versions of the ALAC model are now being promulgated and debated 
in legislatures throughout the country. Though there have been variations in 
language and strategies, the core principles of the legislation are identical. 
The ALAC model provides that “it shall be the public policy of this state to 
protect its citizens from the application of foreign laws when the 
                                                                                                     
 50. See Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the Anti-Sharia Movement, N.Y. TIMES, July 
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application of a foreign law will result in the violation of a right guaranteed 
by the constitution of this state or of the United States . . . .”53  The act 
further provides that a “foreign law, legal code, or system means any law, 
legal code, or system of a jurisdiction outside of any state or territory of the 
United States.”54  Finally, the ALAC model states that “a contract . . . shall 
be void and unenforceable if the jurisdiction chosen includes any law, legal 
code or system . . . that would not grant the parties the same fundamental 
liberties, rights, and privileges granted under the U.S. and [State] Con-
stitutions.”55  Similar versions of the ALAC model act are now being 
debated in over twenty-three states.56  Though the language of the ALAC 
model act appears innocuous and unremarkable, the outspoken state legis-
lators that sponsor the bills have been clear in their motivations.  
The most notorious of proposals have surfaced in Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. In Oklahoma, the legislation pro-
cess involved an unusual player—the citizenry. There, State Representative 
Rex Duncan was the lead sponsor and chief author of the “Save Our State 
Amendment.”57  The legislation called for an amendment to the state’s 
constitution to prohibit the state courts from following the legal precepts of 
other nations and, specifically, provided that “the courts shall not consider 
international law or Sharia Law.”58  Representative Duncan had compared 
Sharia law to a “cancer” and stated that his proposed bill “will constitute a 
pre-emptive strike against Sharia law coming to Oklahoma . . . .”59  “While 
Oklahoma is still able to defend itself against this sort of hideous invasion,” 
Duncan warned, “we should do so.”60  After passing the State Senate and 
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House with overwhelming support, the Secretary of State and Election 
Board presented the amendment to the public for a vote of approval.61  The 
proposed amendment passed with seventy percent of the public 
approving.62 
Immediately after the vote, Muneer Awad, the Executive Director of 
the Oklahoma Council for American-Islamic Relations, filed suit.63  Mr. 
Awad, a Muslim who “adheres to the religious principles from the Koran 
and the teachings of Mohammed,”64  alleged that the “Save Our State 
Amendment” violated his rights under both the Establishment Clause and 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.65  More specifically, Awad 
objected “to the . . . singling out [of] his religion for negative treatment.”66  
He argued that the amendment would “stigmatiz[e] him and others who 
practice the Muslim faith” and would inhibit the practice of Islam by 
“disabling a court from probating his last will and testament (which 
contains references to Sharia law) . . . . ”67 
After a federal district court granted a preliminary injunction, en-
joining Oklahoma from certifying the election results,68 the case moved to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit reached 
a similar conclusion yet did not move past Awad’s Establishment Clause 
claim.69  The court determined that Mr. Awad had suffered “a form of 
‘personal and unwelcome’ conduct with an amendment to the Oklahoma 
Constitution that would target his religion for disfavored treatment.”70  
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Because of the singular targeting of Islam, the court applied the Larson71 
test. Larson provides that if a law discriminates among religions, it will 
survive only if the law is “closely fitted to the furtherance of any com-
pelling interest asserted.”72 
Oklahoma was unable to provide such a compelling interest. The 
government had argued that “Oklahoma . . . has a compelling interest in 
determining what law is applied in Oklahoma courts.”73  But the court 
rejected this argument and responded that while this concern was “valid,” 
this “general statement alone [was] not sufficient to establish a compelling 
interest for the purposes of this case.”74  The government, the court 
explained, failed to “identify any actual problem the challenged amendment 
seeks to solve.”75  Indeed, at the preliminary injunction hearing, Oklahoma 
had failed to present a single example of an Oklahoma court applying 
Sharia law or the legal precepts of other nations.76  Finally, after finding no 
compelling interest, the court went on to conclude that “[e]ven if the state 
could identify and support a reason to single out and restrict Sharia law in 
its courts, the amendment’s complete ban of Sharia law is hardly an 
exercise of narrow tailoring.”77 
Oklahoma’s failures before the Tenth Circuit have not deterred other 
states from advancing similar versions of the ALAC model act. In the 2011 
session of the Tennessee General Assembly, State Senator Bill Ketron 
proposed a bill that would seek to limit material support of “homegrown 
terrorism.”78  Homegrown terrorism, the legislation explained, “is primarily 
the result of a legal-political-military doctrine and system adhered to . . . by 
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tens of millions if not hundreds of millions of its followers around the 
world. This legal-political-military doctrine and system is known as 
sharia . . . .”79  Sharia, according to the bill, “requires all its adherents to 
actively and passively support the replacement of America’s constitutional 
republic, including the representative government of this state with a 
political system based upon sharia.”80  The bill, which was aimed at curbing 
material support for terrorism, went on to state that “[a]ny person who 
knowingly provides material support or resources to a designated sharia 
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall commit a [felony] 
offense.”81 
After introducing the bill, Senator Ketron faced an immediate reproach 
from civil rights groups.82  Accordingly, with the threat of lawsuits on the 
horizon, Ketron and his co-sponsors rewrote the bill and eliminated all 
references to Islam and Sharia.83  The revised bill, entitled the “Material 
Support to Designated Entities Act of 2011,” passed with overwhelming 
support, and while there contained no reference to a specific religion in the 
final version, the bill’s supporters exclaimed that the legislation remained 
aimed at “protecting our citizens from those who would use religious 
doctrine as a justification to commit criminal activities or terrorist acts.”84 
The statutory errors in the Oklahoma and Tennessee statutes has 
undoubtedly been instructive for the Virginia and Pennsylvania legislators 
who have also sought to pass anti-Sharia legislation. In Virginia, Delegate 
Bob Marshall has introduced legislation that would prohibit judges from 
deciding “any issue in a case or action before that court . . . in whole or in 
part based on the authority of foreign law except to the extent that the 
United States Constitution or Constitution of Virginia or any federal or state 
law requires or authorizes the consideration of such foreign law.”85  
Likewise, Delegate Rick Morris has introduced a similar yet broader bill 
that proclaims it to be: 
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 82. See Chas Sisk, Ketron, Matheny Rewrite Shariah Bill, THE TENNESSEAN, March 
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A violation of the public policy of the Commonwealth for a contract, 
arbitration agreement, or other agreement to provide for the choice of a 
foreign law to govern the interpretation, enforcement, or resolution of 
any claim under the contact, arbitration agreement, or other agreement if 
the foreign law chosen, as applied to the contract, arbitration agreement, 
or other agreement, would violate a person’s rights guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution or the Constitution of Virginia.86  
In Pennsylvania, State Representative RoseMarie Swanger has intro-
duced legislation that orders courts to disregard “a foreign legal code or 
system which does not grant the parties . . . the same fundamental liberties, 
rights and privileges granted under the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of Pennsylvania.”87  Any contract between parties which 
invokes a foreign legal system, the bill states, “violates the public policy of 
the Commonwealth and shall be void and unenforceable if the foreign legal 
code . . . would not grant the parties the same fundamental liberties, rights 
and privileges granted under the United States Constitution and the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.”88  Like the legislation in Virginia as well as the 
ALAC model act, the bill does not actually mention Sharia or Islam in the 
text. Nevertheless, Rep. Swanger has not shied from revealing the moti-
vation behind the legislation. In a letter to her colleagues, Rep. Swanger 
warned that “foreign laws and legal doctrines—including and especially 
Shariah law—are finding their way into US court cases.”89  Moreover, she 
added, “[t]he embrace of foreign legal systems such as Shariah law, which 
is inherently hostile to our constitutional liberties is a violation of the 
principles on which our nation was founded.”90 
Virginia and Pennsylvania are now just two of twenty-one states that 
are currently debating legislation that would forbid judges from considering 
foreign or Sharia law.91  As of this writing, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Arizona 
and Louisiana already have substantially similar laws in effect.92  Though 
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the ALAC model act and the most recent state legislative examples focus, 
at least facially, on “foreign law,” the drive and rhetoric that surrounds 
these initiatives is clear. At its core, these bills and the anti-Sharia move-
ment is based upon a belief that America is at risk and that Muslims are the 
danger. Islam, the argument goes, demands a foreign and fraudulent set of 
beliefs that are irreconcilable with American legal and societal principles. 
As Tennessee State Senator Rick Womick recently opined while attending 
the Preserving Freedom Conference93  in Madison, Tennessee, “I don’t trust 
one Muslim in our military because they’re commanded to lie to 
us . . . . And if they truly are a devout Muslim, and follow the Quran and 
the Sunnah, then I feel threatened because they’re commanded to kill 
me.”94  While such rhetoric may appear hyperbolic or simply the bellowing 
of a politician, the scale and breadth of the legislative initiatives indicate 
that the anti-Sharia movement is no longer a fringe effort. Moreover, while 
claims of Muslim-Americans being fundamentally ill-suited for citizenship 
is indeed extreme, such arguments towards minority groups are by no 
means unique to our history. Indeed, during World War II and the Cold 
War, the American public and the government identified the Japanese, 
liberals and members (or suspected members) of the American Communist 
Party as disloyal and dangerous threats to the American way of life. 
V. Executive Order 9066 and the Anti-Japanese Backlash of World War II 
On February 19, 1942, ten weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066.95  
The brief order authorized the Secretary of War to: 
[D]esignate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such 
action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places 
and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may 
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determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with 
respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave 
shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the 
appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion.96 
Though the order said nothing of Japan or Japanese-Americans, to 
those behind the order’s formulation, its intent was clear.  In a broad sense, 
the order gave the military “the power to exclude any persons from design-
nated areas in order to secure national defense objectives against sabotage 
and espionage.”97  Specifically, however, “the order was used, as the Pres-
ident, his responsible Cabinet officers and the West Coast Congressional 
delegation knew it would be, to exclude persons of Japanese ancestry, both 
American citizens and resident aliens, from the West Coast.”98  In the 
months that followed, over 100,000 people were forced to leave their 
homes and businesses and enter military-run internment camps.99  Two-
thirds of the men, women and children were American citizens.100  In all, 
the group represented ninety-percent of all Japanese-Americans.101  No 
criminal charges were ever brought against the evacuees, nor were they 
given an opportunity to protest their displacement.102  They were told to 
bring only what they could carry with them and were soon shipped to one 
of ten permanent internment camps along the West Coast.103  Surrounded 
by barbed wire and watchtowers, they remained in the camps for three 
years.104 
A. Military Necessity:  Government Justification for the Camps 
As the Executive Order made clear, the impetus for the decision was 
“military necessity.”105  In the years and months prior to Pearl Harbor, Nazi 
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Germany had successfully invaded much of Europe and, at the time, 
American intelligence services presumed that the invasions had been aided 
by foreign agents and Nazi sympathizers.106  Predictably, military officials 
feared that a similar Japanese invasion of the American West Coast would 
be abetted through similar subversive means.107  Some high-ranking mili-
tary officials presumed such espionage was already underway. Just days 
after the attack on Pearl Harbor and without any direct evidence, Secretary 
of the Navy Frank Knox noted that “the most effective Fifth Column work 
of the entire war was done in Hawaii.”108  Knox was, in effect, placing 
“blame for the Pearl Harbor defeat at the door of the ethnic Japanese in the 
United States.”109  As history later proved, not only was Knox’s claim in-
accurate, it ignored the fact that many of the Japanese living in Hawaii had 
come to the defense and aid of the United States during the Pearl Harbor 
attack.110 
Knox was by no means alone in his belief that the Japanese posed a 
threat. Perhaps the single most important “security” justification for the 
decision to remove the ethnic Japanese came from John L. DeWitt, the 
Commanding General of the Western Defense Command of the United 
States.111  DeWitt was tasked with preparing the American West Coast for a 
Japanese invasion, and he was instrumental in formulating and executing 
the Japanese internment plans.112 In 1942, DeWitt released his Final 
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Report:  Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942.113  The report 
was a collection of military and intelligence reports and theories that had 
developed over the past year.  In it, DeWitt focused on a confluence of 
factors: 
[S]ignaling from shore to enemy submarines; arms and contraband 
found by the FBI during raids on [Japanese] homes and businesses; 
danger to evacuees from vigilantes; concentration of the ethnic Japanese 
population around or near militarily sensitive areas; the number of 
Japanese ethnic organizations on the coast which might shelter pro-
Japanese attitudes or activities such as Emperor-worshipping 
Shinto . . . .114 
From this description, two important factors stood out to DeWitt and 
the military leaders:  the signaling to Japanese submarines from the coast-
line and the presence of arms and contraband.  An investigation by the FCC 
later discovered that DeWitt’s claim of signaling was “so utterly unsub-
stantiated that, in its brief to the Supreme Court, the Justice Department was 
careful not to rely on DeWitt’s Final Report as a factual basis for the 
military decision it had to defend. There simply had not been any iden-
tifiable shore-to-ship signaling.”115  Likewise, the claim of finding arms 
and contraband amongst the Japanese population was misleading, if not 
outright false. By May 1942, the FBI had, in fact, seized 2,592 guns, 
199,000 rounds of ammunition, 1,652 sticks of dynamite, 1,458 radio 
receivers, 2,014 cameras, and numerous other items from Japanese im-
migrants.116  However, these statistics and DeWitt's report failed to ac-
knowledge that most of these weapons had been confiscated through raids 
on a sporting goods store and a general store owner’s warehouse.117  The 
Justice Department later concluded that DeWitt’s claims regarding arms 
and contraband were insignificant: 
We have not, however, uncovered through these searches any dangerous 
persons that we could not otherwise know about. We have not found 
among all the sticks of dynamite and gunpowder any evidence that any 
of it was to be used in bombs . . . . We have not found a single machine 
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gun nor have we found any gun in any circumstances indicating that it 
was to be used in a manner helpful to our enemies.118 
In sum, even in 1941–42, intelligence and military officials acknow-
ledged that there was no direct evidence of a subversive Japanese threat and 
that “no sabotage has taken place to date.”119  Still, the fear of a Japanese 
invasion was overwhelming and the military was convinced that every 
precaution—even those once thought unimaginable—had to be taken. 
B. Disloyal and Subversive:  The Public’s Justification for the Camps 
Generally, the American public agreed with the military’s sen-
timent.120  Pearl Harbor and the shocking stories of Japanese brutality 
toward American prisoners-of-war sparked intense fear and hatred within 
the United States. Many believed the threat of Japanese saboteurs was clear 
and tangible. One prominent businessman wrote at the time: 
There will be no armed uprising of Japanese. There will undoubtedly be 
some sabotage financed by Japan and executed largely by imported 
agents or agents already imported . . . . The Japanese, if undisturbed and 
disloyal, should be well equipped for obvious physical espionage. A 
great part of this work was probably completed and forwarded to Tokio 
[sic] years ago, such as soundings and photography of every inch of the 
Coast . . . .121 
Such attitudes were common throughout the public. According to 
polling conducted by the Office of Facts and Figures in the Office for 
Emergency Management, there was a strong consensus that the government 
had correctly decided to sequester Japanese immigrants.122  Equally, much 
of the population agreed that even Japanese-American citizens posed a 
threat to the nation and should be removed from the general population.123  
Interestingly, however, there were important variances in the opinions. 
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Lesser-educated respondents were more likely to consider the Japanese as a 
dangerous threat and were advocates for much harsher treatment of the 
Japanese.124  In addition, southerners tended to have scathing opinions of 
the Japanese, while residents of the East Coast tended to view German-
Americans as a greater threat.125 
The natural response of most Americans following Pearl Harbor and 
upon the beginning of the war is perhaps unsurprising. There was also, 
however, an organized effort to draw attention to the “Japanese-American 
threat” that should draw pause, for it bears a striking resemblance to the 
anti-Muslim efforts of today. Members of Congress and Western poli-
ticians, for example, were some of the most vocal and aggressive advocates 
of the internment camps.126  The California Joint Immigration Committee 
sent a lengthy report to California newspapers that supposedly provided 
numerous examples of Japanese espionage and treason.127  The report 
repeated the fundamental claim that the ethnic Japanese were “totally 
unassimilable” and declared that “those born in this country are American 
citizens by right of birth, but they are also Japanese citizens, liable . . . to be 
called to bear arms for their Emperor, either in front of, or behind, enemy 
lines.”128  The report even went so far as to attack Japanese language 
schools, which it characterized as “a blind to cover instruction similar to 
that received by a young student in Japan—that his is a superior race, the 
divinity of the Japanese Emperor, the loyalty that every Japanese, wherever 
born, or residing, owes his Emperor and Japan.”129 
Nativist and other conservative organizations were also active in 
promoting the backlash. The Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden 
West viewed the Pearl Harbor attack and war with Japan as a natural 
consequence of America’s liberal immigration policy.  In its January 1942 
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issue of The Grizzly Bear, the organization’s flagship publication, the editor 
chided the American people for failing to heed their prior warnings: 
Had the warnings been heeded—had the federal and state authorities 
been “on the alert” and rigidly enforced the Exclusion Law and the 
Alien Land Law; had the Jap propaganda agencies in this country been 
silenced; had the legislation been enacted . . . denying citizenship to 
offspring of all aliens ineligible to citizenship; had the Japs been 
prohibited from colonizing in strategic locations; had not Jap-dollars 
been so eagerly sought by White landowners and businessmen; had a 
dull ear been turned to the honeyed words of the Japs and the pro-Japs; 
had the yellow-Jap and the white-Jap “fifth columnists” been disposed 
of within the law; had Japan been denied the privilege of using 
California as a breeding ground for dual-citizens (nisei);—the treach-
erous Japs probably would not have attacked Pearl Harbor December 7, 
1941, and this country would not today be at war with Japan.130 
Similarly, the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association, long a critic of 
Japanese immigrants as a source of cheap-labor along the West Coast, 
offered a ringing endorsement of the internment camps and relocation 
efforts in a Saturday Evening Post article: 
We’re charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons. 
We might as well be honest. We do. It’s a question of whether the white 
man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown man. They came into this 
valley to work, and they stayed to take over . . . . If all the Japs were 
removed tomorrow, we’d never miss them in two weeks, because the 
white farmers can take over and produce everything the Jap grows. And 
we don’t want them back when the war ends, either.131 
Throughout the country, the tension and fear of Japanese saboteurs 
was palpable. Nevertheless, the theory behind Executive Order 9066 and 
the fear of Japanese espionage were exaggerated if not completely 
misguided. Finally, on January 2, 1945, the exclusion order was withdrawn 
and Japanese-Americans were allowed to return to their homes and rebuild 
their lives.132 
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On February 19, 1976, as part of the Bicentennial Celebration of the 
Constitution, President Gerald Ford issued President Proclamation 4417. 
The Proclamation declared that in addition to celebrating the nation’s 
Constitution and proud history, we must also recognize “our mistakes.”133  
As Ford observed, “[w]e now know what we should have known then”—
Executive Order 9066 and the decision to evacuate loyal Japanese-
Americans was “wrong.”134  In 1980, Congress established the Commission 
on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians.135  The Commission 
was tasked with investigating the motivation and implementation of 
Executive Order 9066 and, following a two-year investigation, concluded 
that the factors shaping the internment decision were in fact “race prejudice, 
war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.”136  Finally, in 1988, 
Congress passed the Civil Liberties Restoration Act.137  Within the act, 
Congress recognized that “a grave injustice was done to both citizens and 
permanent residents of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and 
internment of civilians during World War II.”138  Moreover, the act offered 
reparations to each of the Japanese-Americans who had suffered 
discrimination, personal humiliation and loss of liberty and property as a 
result of the U.S. government’s actions.139 
VI. Domestic Communism and the Red Scare 
By the end of World War II, it was clear to many American policy-
makers that the nation’s next great threat was the Soviet Union and the 
spread of Communism. While it is perhaps unclear if Joseph Stalin did in 
fact share Adolf Hitler’s goal of global domination,140 by the start of the 
Korean War in 1950, American policymakers had all the evidence they 
required. Immediately following World War II, crisis beget crisis. The U.S. 
and U.S.S.R would disagree over the make-up of the Polish government in 
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1945.141  The Soviets would intervene in Turkey, Iran and the Greek Civil 
War in 1947.142  Berlin would be divided between East and West in 1948, 
and in 1949 the Soviets would detonate their first atomic bomb.143  
Amongst the foreign policy establishment in Washington, it was clear:  
Stalin and Communism, like any totalitarian threat, were on a mission of 
global conquest, and only the United States stood in their way.144 
Within the U.S., a similar fear and accusation would be lodged at the 
American Communist Party.  As Ellen Schrecker—a historian and expert 
on McCarthyism—has written, “Communist party members were believed 
to be part of a secret conspiracy, fanatics who would automatically do 
whatever Stalin told them to do.”145  In the spring of 1945, the State De-
partment advised President Truman “to treat the American Communist 
movement as a potential fifth column.”146  Like those of Japanese ancestry 
along the West Coast, members of the American Communist Party were 
presumed to be agents of the KGB and deeply loyal to the Soviet Union. To 
be sure, there were several examples of Soviet espionage throughout the 
Cold War. Nevertheless, “[s]uch fear at home was hardly warranted.”147  In 
fact, much of the espionage actually occurred during World War II. By 
1946, fifty thousand, or around half of the membership of the U.S. 
Communist Party’s Political Association had left the group.148  Once the 
Cold War had begun, “the demonization of American communism and the 
federal government’s purge of its left-wing employees made it impossible 
for the Soviet Union to recruit any spies from the party’s declining 
ranks.”149 Indeed, as the renowned historian Walter LaFeber noted, 
“[i]ronically Americans began their search for communists at the same time 
the Communist party had to begin its own search for members.”150 
As Schrecker has discovered, “what transformed the Communist threat 
into a national obsession was not its plausibility, but the involvement of the 
federal government.”151  By the late 1940’s nearly every branch and agency 
                                                                                                     
 141. Id. 
 142.  Id. at chap. 3. 
 143. See SCHRECKER, supra note 8, at 20. 
 144. See id. at 20−21. 
 145. Id. 
 146. LAFEBER, supra note 140, at 24. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 23. 
 150. Id. at 24. 
 151. See SCHRECKER, supra note 8, at 25. 
208 19 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 183 (2012) 
of government—from the Post Office to the State Department—was 
engulfed in the anti-Communist crusade.152  Each day brought news of a 
new executive order, congressional investigation, or criminal prosecution. 
The media became a willing and able promoter of the government message 
and by the outbreak of the Korean War, the government had “helped 
construct the ideological scaffolding for McCarthyism” and sent “a very 
strong signal about the alien nature of communism and its dangers.”153 
It was the Executive Branch—the Truman administration and its 
successors—that did the most to set the tone and cultivate the anti-
Communist threat.154 Specifically, Truman implemented 1) an anti-
Communist loyalty-security program for government employees in March 
1947, and 2) initiated criminal prosecutions against members and suspected 
members of the American Communist Party. 
A. Executive Order 9835 and the Loyalty-Security Program 
While it was Truman who provided the final clearance of the internal 
anti-Communist “security” programs, it was J. Edgar Hoover and the F.B.I. 
that provided the political and ideological force. On March 26, 1947, 
Hoover, a fervent and conservative anti-Communist, forcefully presented 
his views of the internal Communist threat in the United States.155  
Testifying before Congress (something Hoover rarely agreed to do) at the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities, Hoover offered a doctrine 
that would delineate “the main battlegrounds of the McCarthy era,” namely, 
institutions such as labor unions, the film industry, and the federal 
government.156  Hoover declared that the Communist movement in the 
United States “stands for the destruction of our American form of 
government . . . and it stands for the creation of the ‘Soviet of the United 
States’ and ultimate world revolution.”157  “The Communist,” Hoover 
added, “once he is fully trained and indoctrinated realizes that he can create 
                                                                                                     
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. (“The media was the government’s partner, largely because it amplified 
messages that come from Washington.”). 
 154. See id. at 27 (“The executive branch did more than provide the psychic setting for 
McCarthyism. The specific steps it took to combat the alleged threat of internal communism 
were to intensify the national preoccupation with the issue.”). 
 155. Id. at 126. 
 156. Id. at 126.  
 157. Hearing on H.R. 1884 and H.R. 2122 Before the H. Comm. On Un-American 
Activities, 80th Cong. 1 (1947) (statement of J. Edgar Hoover). 
A MONOLITHIC THREAT 209 
his order in the United States only by ‘bloody revolution.’”158  Finally, 
Hoover warned, “[t]he Communist Party of the United States is a fifth 
column if there ever was one . . . . There is no doubt as to where a real 
Communist's loyalty rests. Their allegiance is to Russia, not the United 
States . . . .”159 
With this testimony, Hoover provided not only a warning about the 
threat of Communism within the United States but also a call to action and 
a blueprint for purging Communism from American society and its 
institutions. It would not be long before the entire U.S. government heeded 
his call. On March 21, 1947, President Truman signed Executive Order 
9835.160  Though the government had long had a requirement for examin-
ing the backgrounds of government employees, E.O. 9835 greatly enlarged 
the program.161  Before, only overtly disloyal activities such as sabotage, 
treason, or advocacy for the overthrow of the government constituted 
grounds for termination. With Truman’s order, any “sympathetic associ-
ation” with an organization or movement that had been “designated by the 
Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive” became 
a violation.162  Predictably, because the order did not define what exactly 
“association” entailed, “the criteria were vague and came to be applied to a 
wide range of political beliefs and activities.”163  Soon, people who were on 
the “wrong” mailing lists, owned the wrong books or had relatives that 
belonged to politically suspect groups became targets.164  One man nearly 
lost his job after he subleased his apartment to a person who had 
“associations” with Communist front organizations.165  Another employee 
was suspended because he remained in “close and continuing association 
with [his] parents,” individuals who were under suspicion because they had 
joined a group on the Attorney General’s blacklist to buy cheap insurance 
and a burial plot.166 
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By 1951, as the “Red Scare” swept through the nation, the criteria for 
dismissal under the loyalty program had changed from “reasonable 
grounds” for believing in someone’s disloyalty to the broader language of 
“reasonable doubt as to loyalty.”167  In 1953, President Eisenhower revoked 
9835 and replaced it with Executive Order 10450.168  Eisenhower feared 
that Truman and E.O. 9835 had been too lenient, and through E.O. 10450, 
he ordered all federal agencies to determine whether any federal employees 
posed a “security risk.”169  Additionally, this Order expanded the def-
initions and conditions that were used in the evaluations; while E.O. 9835 
had focused largely on an employee’s political affiliations and activities, 
E.O. 10450 enlarged the scope of investigation to personal behavior and 
character.170  For example, Eisenhower’s Order provided that any “crim-
inal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, 
habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual perversion” 
may constitute a security threat and grounds for dismissal.171  As The 
Washington Post reported at the time, Eisenhower’s order had created more 
than a loyalty test; it had implemented a “suitability test.”172  As the lang-
uage of the new order seemed to insinuate, “a person who drinks too 
much,” “an incorrigible gossip,” “homosexuals,” or simply “neurotics,” 
could now be deemed disloyal and a threat to national security.173 
Between 1946 and 1956, around 2,700 federal employees were 
dismissed from government service for loyalty-security reasons.174  Many 
others simply resigned out of fear of the loyalty review process and the 
humiliation it often brought on oneself and family.175  The loyalty review 
process was a well-known anti-Communist program. Nevertheless, it was 
the criminal prosecution of American Communist Party members and 
suspected members that captivated the nation and brought the “Red Scare” 
and “McCarthyism” into mainstream America. 
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B. Dennis and the Prosecution of Suspected Communists 
The decision to criminally prosecute members and suspected members 
of the American Communist Party “seems to have been made in a rather 
haphazard way, the product of bureaucratic routines rather than a high-level 
political decision.”176  With pressure mounting from Congress and J. Edgar 
Hoover, Attorney General Tom Clark laid the groundwork for the process 
in 1948.177  Because the federal government feared that simply outlawing 
the Communist Property would be inconsistent with American ideals and 
the Constitution, Clark had Department of Justice attorneys scour statute 
books.178  Eventually, the Department settled on the Smith Act of 1940. 
Passed just prior to the beginning of World War II, the Smith Act provides 
that anyone who: 
[K]nowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, 
necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the 
government of the United States . . . Shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible 
for employment by the United States or any department or agency 
thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.179  
On July 20, 1948, arrest warrants were issued for twelve national 
committee members of the American Communist Party including Eugene 
Dennis, the party’s general secretary. As proscribed under the Smith Act, 
the members were charged with conspiring to “teach and advocate” the 
“violent overthrow” of the American government.180  The transcripts from 
the subsequent trials, however, demonstrate that proving this accusation 
was extremely difficult and the prosecution was forced to rely on 
particularly militant passages from the works of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin.181  
The government’s star witness, Louis Budenz, was the former managing 
editor of the Communist Party’s newspaper, The Daily Worker.182  In 
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testimony, Budenz stated that “socialism can only be attained by the violent 
shattering of the capitalist state . . . .  In the United States this would mean 
that the Communist Party of the United States is basically committed to the 
overthrow of the Government . . . as set up by the Constitution . . . .”183  In 
addition, Budenz further bolstered the government’s case by declaring the 
party’s strict loyalty to the Soviet Union and its quest to infiltrate labor 
unions throughout the country.184 
From the very beginning, both sides knew that the trials would be as 
much of a public awareness campaign as it was a judicial prosecution. 
Throughout the trials, the Truman administration went to great lengths to 
use the process as a way to shape to the public’s view of domestic 
communism.185  The prosecutors “purposely forced several defendants into 
contempt of court,” a tactic that “gave prosecutors a pretext for putting 
some of the party’s leaders in jail during the trials and thus dramatizing 
how dangerous Communists could be.”186  Likewise, due to the clearly 
political nature of the trials, “much of the evidence that the government 
produced had no relation to the case at hand but was designed to reinforce 
the negative image of the defendants . . . .”187  While both sides knew that 
the constitutionality of the Smith Act and the prosecutions under it would 
have to be settled by the Supreme Court, the government achieved its goal 
nonetheless:  the trials “transformed party members from political dissi-
dents into criminals—with all the implications that such associations 
inspired in a nation of law-abiding citizens.”188 
It is difficult to measure the extent to which these government 
measures—the loyalty-security program and the criminal prosecution of the 
American Communist Party—carried public opinion and built an anti-
Communist furor in the U.S. Undoubtedly, however, the American public 
was swayed.  
                                                                                                     
under the protection of the Catholic Church, from which he received the financial and 
spiritual support he had once gotten from the party.”). 
 183. Trial Testimony in Joint Appendix, U.S. v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950) 
reprinted in ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM:  A BRIEF HISTORY WITH 
DOCUMENTS 204 (Lynn Hunt et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2002). 
 184. See SCHRECKER supra note 8, at 50. 
 185. Id. at 27 (“By putting Communists on trial, the Truman administration . . . trans-
formed political dissidents into criminals—with all the implications that such associations 
inspired in a nation of law-abiding citizens.”). 
 186. Id. at 51. 
 187. Id. at 28. 
 188. Id. at 27. 
A MONOLITHIC THREAT 213 
VII. The Supreme Court’s Opinion:  Korematsu, Dennis and the Necessity 
of National Security 
The behemoth of “national security” has frequently been touted to 
justify the government’s intrusion into the fundamental rights of 
Americans; and at times of national crisis, the American public has often 
welcomed these actions. Nevertheless, as this note has described, “national 
security” has also often been employed to isolate minority groups and stifle 
differing points of view. Ellen Schrecker has noted that much of the 
rhetoric and action which characterized the Japanese internment decision 
and Red Scare can be traced to America’s counter-subversive tradition and 
[T]he irrational notion that outsiders (who could be political dissidents, 
foreigners, or members of racial or religious minorities) threatened the 
nation from within. Projecting their own fears and insecurities onto a 
demonized “Other,” many Americans have found convenient scapegoats 
among the powerless minorities within their midst.189 
During World War II and in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, 
“[f]ear of possible Japanese sabotage and espionage was rampant, and an 
outraged public felt an understandable instinct to lash out at those who had 
attacked the country.”190  Still, as Professor Geoffrey Stone recently il-
lustrated, Japanese internment “was also very much an extension of more 
than a century of racial prejudice against the ‘yellow peril.’”191  Throughout 
1941 and 1942, “[r]acist statements and sentiments permeated the 
debate . . . about how to deal with individuals of Japanese descent.”192 
Before the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States,193 the 
government justified the internment of the Japanese as a “military 
necessity.” The government cited the Final Report of Lt. General John L. 
DeWitt and, in its brief, concluded that the Japanese were “a large, 
unassimilated, tightly knit racial group, bound to an enemy nation by strong 
ties of race, culture, custom and religion.”194  Hidden from the Supreme 
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Court, however, was the fact that no evidence existed to support the 
contention that any persons of Japanese ancestry had been involved in 
espionage along the West Coast.195  J. Edgar Hoover himself had concluded 
at the time that the call for mass evacuations was based largely on “public 
hysteria” rather than fact.196 Only later was it revealed that the “govern-
ment’s Supreme Court briefs in Korematsu were deliberately sanitized to 
keep from the justices any facts contradicting General DeWitt’s fab-
rications.”197 
The Court accepted the government’s word and the necessity of 
national security, however, and in a six-to-three decision upheld the 
internment decision.198  Writing for the Court, Justice Hugo Black con-
cluded: 
[W]e are not unmindful of the hardships imposed . . . upon a large group 
of American citizens. But hardships are part of war, and war is an 
aggregation of hardships . . . . To cast this case into outlines of racial 
prejudice . . . confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the 
[West Coast] because of hostility to . . . his race. He was excluded 
because . . . the . . . military authorities . . . decided that the military 
urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry 
be segregated from the [area] . . . . We cannot—by availing ourselves of 
the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these 
actions were unjustified.199 
Following World War II, it did not take long for many Americans to 
realize the egregiousness of the internment decision.200  Nevertheless, as 
World War II drew to a close, the nation quickly turned its eyes and fear 
towards the Soviet Union and the threat of Communism. Once again, the 
government pointed to national security to justify unprecedented inter-
vention. In scenes reminiscent of the fury that gripped the nation in 1941, 
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“the nation demonized members of the Communist Party and . . . [r]ed-
hunters demanded, and got, the blacklisting of thousands of individuals and 
a fear of ideological contamination swept the nation.”201   
In Dennis v. United States,202 the Supreme Court was asked to 
determine whether the U.S. government could criminally prosecute mem-
bers of the American Communist Party under the Smith Act. In a six-to-two 
decision, the Court again sided with the government and concluded that 
“the power of the Congress to protect the Government of the United States 
from armed rebellion is a proposition which requires little discussion.”203  
In the majority and concurring opinions, national security concerns pre-
dominated. At the time, the Korean War was raging and, as Justice Vinson 
noted, “the context of world crisis after crisis” justified the government’s 
prosecutorial powers.204  “The mere fact,” Vinson concluded, “that from the 
period 1945 to 1948 the petitioners’ activities did not result in an attempt to 
overthrow the Government by force and violence is of course no answer to 
the fact that there was a group that was ready to make the attempt.”205 
As Korematsu and Dennis illustrate, when faced with questions of 
national security and civil liberties, for much of the last century the 
dominant approach of the Supreme Court was “to employ the ‘logical’ 
presumption that military and executive officials making wartime decisions 
act fairly and reasonably.”206  In short, “the Court embraced a highly defer-
ential stance, presuming that restrictions of civil liberties in wartime were 
constitutionally justified so long as the government could offer a reasonable 
explanation for its action.”207 
Eventually, the Supreme Court altered its approach. In Yates v. United 
States,208 the Supreme Court put an end to the government’s prosecution of 
suspected Communists under the Smith Act. Writing for the Court, Justice 
Harlan explained that  
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[W]hen it comes to Party advocacy or teaching in the sense of a call to 
forcible action at some future time we cannot but regard this record as 
strikingly deficient. At best this voluminous record shows but a half 
dozen or so scattered incidents . . . . We are unable to regard this spora-
dic showing as sufficient to justify viewing the Communist Party as the 
nexus between these petitioners and the conspiracy charged.209 
With the Yates decision and several others decided over the same term, 
the Court put an end to the “Red Scare” era of Supreme Court juris-
prudence.210  The argument of national security necessity, however, did not 
vanish. More recently, the Supreme Court addressed the Bush (and Obama) 
administration’s claims of executive authority in the war on terrorism. Thus 
far, the Court has refused to grant the degree of deference that led to the 
results in Korematsu and Dennis.  In Rasul v. Bush,211 the Court held that 
federal courts have habeas corpus jurisdiction to review the legality of the 
confinement of the Guantanamo Bay detainees. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,212  
decided on the same day as Rasul in 2004, the Court went even further in its 
refusal to grant undue deference to the military and executive officials in 
the war on terrorism.  
Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was seized in Afghanistan by the 
Northern Alliance and turned over to the U.S. military.213  After secretly 
shipping Hamdi to a naval base in Virginia, the Bush administration 
claimed that because Hamdi was an “enemy combatant,” he could be 
detained indefinitely, without access to counsel and without any formal 
charge or proceeding.214  The Supreme Court disagreed.  In an eight-to-one 
decision, the Court held that the Bush administration had violated Hamdi’s 
due process rights.215  Writing for the plurality, Justice O’Connor declared 
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that “a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy 
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and 
a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertion before a 
neutral decisionmaker.”216  O’Conner added, it “is during our most challen-
ging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process 
is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our 
commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.”217  In 
rejecting the government’s contention that the Court should play “a heavily 
circumscribed role” in reviewing the actions of the executive in wartime, 
O’Connor pointedly observed that “a state of war is not a blank check for 
the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”218 
While the Supreme Court’s recent decisions have offered hope to those 
who fear that another period of hysteria may not lead to another Korematsu 
or Dennis, there remain strong reasons to doubt that the Court has moved 
completely past the period of granting “logical presumptions” to the 
government in the realm of national security. 
For one, as a matter of law, Korematsu has never been explicitly 
overruled.219  Of course, the fact that Mr. Korematsu’s conviction was 
never overturned may no longer be relevant. As Lawrence Tribe has 
famously said, it is Justice Jackson’s dissent from Korematsu that has 
“carried the day in the court of history.”220  Furthermore, Justice Antonin 
Scalia has characterized Korematsu on a par with Dred Scott,221  and in 
1988, Congress officially apologized to the Japanese and passed legislation 
that allowed those affected by the relocations and detentions to seek 
redress.222 
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Still, as has been described, in December 1941, the social, legal, 
political and military foundations of the United States were transformed. 
The American citizenry, along with the military, became engulfed in a full-
scale effort to defeat Nazi Germany and the Japanese Empire and virtually 
every aspect of daily life became dedicated to the cause. For many modern 
legal scholars, such a context and crisis would still provide sufficient 
justification for the internment orders. Judge Richard Posner, for example, 
of the United State Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit once noted in a 
debate that he believed Korematsu was “correctly decided.”223  According 
to Posner: 
Unquestionably, the order excluding people of Japanese ancestry from 
the West Coast was tainted by racial prejudice. On the other hand, many 
Japanese Americans had refused to swear unqualified allegiance to the 
United States. Good or bad, it was a military order in a frightening war. 
Although the majority opinion, written by Justice Hugo Black, is very 
poor, the decision itself is defensible.224 
Judge Posner is not alone in his belief that, given the nation’s struggle 
in a “frightening war,” Korematsu was the correct decision at the time. 
Justice Clarence Thomas, in Grutter v. Bollinger,225 chose to quote the 
majority in Korematsu in order to note that “‘[p]ressing public necessity 
may sometimes justify the existence of [racial discrimination].’”226  
Thomas added that “[t]he lesson of Korematsu is that national security 
constitutes a ‘pressing public necessity,’ though the government’s use of 
race to advance that objective must be narrowly tailored.”227 
VIII. Avoiding Alienation and Fostering Integration 
To date, “public necessity” has not called for the mass evacuation and 
internment of Muslim-Americans.  Nor have we seen criminal prosecutions 
or demands that Muslim-Americans withstand a loyalty-security program to 
prove their allegiance. Nonetheless, ‘Islamophobia’ pervades American 
society. Notably, the rhetoric that is employed to justify anti-Sharia laws—a 
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subversive threat, disloyalty, and incongruent values—are remarkably 
similar to the arguments that were utilized during World War II and the 
Cold War. Today, like then, politicians seek to categorize Muslim-
Americans as a mysterious “other” and as a threat to America’s security and 
way of life. 
There is no silver bullet for combating these stereotypes. As our 
nation’s history has shown, minority integration often takes generations and 
is often the result of years of both struggle and tragedy. Thus, while under-
standing there is no single program or law to hasten Muslim-American 
integration, there are perhaps two general principles which political and 
community leaders could follow: 
A. Decouple Integration and Security 
Even if one accepts that Muslim-Americans are not fundamentally 
incompatible with the American system, America’s “War on Terror” and 
the nation’s legitimate need for vigilant security policies remain. It is 
undeniable that America’s enemies abroad continue to point to a radical 
interpretation of Islam as justification for terrorism. It is therefore 
unsurprising that at the governmental level, Muslim-American integration 
and the fear of radicalization tends to be viewed solely as a security issue. 
As this Note has attempted to explain, when faced with similar 
circumstances and fears, the U.S. has, in the name of national security, 
resorted to extreme initiatives that have isolated minority groups and 
violated their constitutional rights. Today, the U.S. government and state 
legislatures are beginning to embark down a similar path. Americans and 
American policymakers do not, however, need to choose solely between 
security and separation. In fact, given the threat of terrorism and radical 
Islam, such a dichotomy would be detrimental to America’s security 
objectives. 
As Professor Samuel J. Rascoff has explained, if we accept the fact 
that Muslim-American integration remains problematic and that subsequent 
alienation (for fear of radicalization) should be avoided, the United States 
must broaden its approach.228  Attempts to integrate Muslim-Americans 
and prevent Muslim-American radicalization cannot be approached solely 
as a “security” issue. In fact, doing so may only serve the opposing purpose. 
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The United States’ limited record in this regard is at best mixed and 
European case studies—where Muslim immigration is far more prevalent—
have provided some important lessons.229  In Britain, “efforts at the man-
agement of Islam stem from the desire to engage in proactive counter-
terrorism, rather than as a corollary to the goal of cultural assimilation.”230  
Thus, the British strategy for integrating Muslims into their society is also 
focused almost purely on the need to combat terrorism. Its threefold 
approach is to “respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism . . . ; 
prevent people from being drawn into terrorism . . . ”; and “work with a 
wide range of sectors and institutions . . . where there are risks of radical-
ization . . . .”231  While such a strategy seems reasonable, it has largely 
backfired and has fueled the notion amongst many Muslims in Britain that 
they are to be feared, not welcomed.232 
The United States federal government has pursued similar means and 
focused almost solely on the “security” side of Muslim-American 
integration. Specifically, the U.S. has fixated on the threat of “radical-
ization” and the fear that Muslim-American communities may embrace 
violent interpretations of Islam. Among other approaches, the government 
has adopted a strategy of engagement with Muslim communities to help 
prevent the threat of a radicalized version of Sharia from taking hold.233  
Simultaneously, the U.S. has sought to “bureaucratize” their Muslim-
American outreach efforts:  the U.S. has “invested heavily in intelligence 
collection and analysis as part of a comprehensive approach to domestic 
counter-radicalization;” the government has created new bureaucratic 
posts—such as the Special Representative to Muslim Communities within 
the State Department—to implement a counter-radicalization and inte-
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gration strategy; and finally, the U.S. has embraced the British model of 
“implicating government functions far afield of the national security 
apparatus of the state.”234  For example, the U.S. Department of Edu-
cation’s Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools recently commissioned a 
report entitled “Recruitment and Radicalization of School-Aged Youth by 
International Terrorist Groups.”235  The study helps “the Department of 
Education identify practical implications” of how recruitment and radical-
ization occur and determine “whether modifications to current policies and 
practices being used by U.S. schools are indicated.”236 
Certainly, such outreach efforts and security strategies may be 
necessary. Nevertheless, these bureaucratized attempts to “counter-
radicalize” Muslims and prevent the entrenchment of a radical form of 
Sharia are only a small piece of a larger puzzle. Integration of Muslim-
Americans under the banner of security cannot be the sole strategy. Instead, 
the U.S. must also view Muslim-American integration as an area of social 
and civil rights policy. Today, Muslim-Americans are more vulnerable to 
financial hardships than any other American religious group.237  Large 
proportions of Muslims now claim there have been times in the past year 
when they were unable to afford basic necessities such as food, shelter, and 
healthcare.238  Likewise, Muslim-Americans are the only major U.S. re-
ligious group where less than half claim they would be able to make a 
major purchase if they needed to.239 
Much of these financial hardships are likely linked to the anti-Muslim 
phobia this Note has described. Nonetheless, if the federal government or a 
state legislator is concerned about Muslim radicalization, these issues—not 
the text of the Qu’ran—are what beg attention. Identifying Muslims as 
members of society who are best integrated through counter-terror and 
counter-radicalization policies only further stigmatizes and alienates them. 
In essence, it teaches Muslims that their most valuable contribution to 
society is to refrain from blowing up a building.  
Surely, this is not the depth of acceptance that Muslim and non-
Muslim Americans desire. Instead, integration initiatives—be it at the 
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national, state, local or non-governmental level—must focus on Muslim-
Americans as just that:  Muslim-Americans. Their religion need not be their 
sole identifying trait and, like any American, policies must recognize their 
desire for the same rights and social benefits that all Americans enjoy. 
Rejecting and denouncing the anti-Sharia laws is one step. Additionally, 
governmental and non-governmental institutions must address the issues 
that Muslim-Americans care about and are affected by:  unemployment, 
education, healthcare, and racism.  Focusing on these issues would not only 
increase the assimilation and acceptance of an important minority group, 
but it would also do far more than any surveillance or police strategy in 
addressing the security fears that now dominate our view and treatment of 
Muslim-Americans. 
B. Do No Harm 
While government and political institutions can play an important part 
in encouraging minority assimilation, the most important players in any 
society are of course not the leaders, but the people. From this idea comes a 
second, yet fairly unremarkable principle: do no harm. Minority acceptance 
in the United States has often been achieved through an organic process that 
reflects the societal, cultural and political changes that slowly occur in the 
background of our lives and experiences. A recent survey by the Pew 
Research Center demonstrates this idea well. As has been noted, a 
remarkable number of non-Muslim Americans have unfavorable views of 
Islam. Nevertheless, Pew found that Americans who simply know a Muslim 
are much more likely to have positive views of Islam and are less likely to 
believe that Islam encourages violence.240  Reza Aslan, a renowned 
Muslim-American political and academic commentator has noted a similar 
historical trend. Aslan argues that while education and interfaith dialogues 
will certainly help Christian and Jewish Americans understand Islam, 
nothing can replace the benefits that result from life’s basic interactions.241  
As Aslan likes to note, Jews were once also regarded as a suspicious and 
untrustworthy group.242  Yet their acceptance into American society was 
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not the result of Christian Americans reading the Torah and learning about 
Judaism. On the contrary, it was through the simple exchanges and 
connections within a community—going to school together, working to-
gether, joining the same clubs and organizations, playing sports together, 
etc.—that fostered the acceptance and integration of Jews.243 
Muslim-Americans can expect to find acceptance through a similar 
path and, importantly, they will likely find acceptance quickly. Muslim-
Americans are extremely “American.” Contrary to the aforementioned 
stereotypes, Muslim-Americans are, in fact, more likely to identify with 
their country than their religion,244 and Muslim-Americans are strong 
believers in American democracy and the American judicial system.245  
Muslim-Americans are not an inherently violent people. A recent Gallup 
report found that Muslim-Americans are actually the least likely of any 
religious group to believe that individual violence towards civilians is ever 
justified.246  Finally, Muslim-Americans are not seeking to force Islam or 
Sharia on all Americans. On the contrary, Muslim-Americans have been 
shown to be extremely open-minded and exceptionally tolerant of other 
religious groups.247  Perhaps unexpectedly, such tolerance may indeed be 
due to the fact that Muslim-Americans are the most racially-diverse 
religious group in the United States.248  They are themselves composed of a 
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variety of racial and ethnic groups and their lineage can be traced to 
colonial America, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, etc.249 
Fears that Islam is incompatible with Western society are also 
misplaced. There are undoubtedly statements from the Qu’ran and sunna 
that run counter to American constitutional principles. However, this fact 
alone does not render Islam a violent and inimical religion. More precisely, 
because Islam—like the other Abrahamic faiths—is based upon a text that 
is centuries old, applying that text in any modern society can be difficult 
and is subject to bizarre and radical interpretations. Christianity and 
Judaism also have their own principles that if taken literally or out of 
context would clearly be hostile to Western ideas of democracy, freedom 
and equality.250 
The goal of this Note is not to prescribe a proper role for Sharia or 
foreign law in the American legal framework. Neither though is that the 
goal of the anti-Sharia legislators who are proposing the Sharia and foreign 
law bans across the country. In fact, this movement and these proposals are 
simply reactions to misconceived fears and these pieces of legislation are 
unnecessary, misguided, and will do vastly more harm than good. From a 
legal standpoint, the Supreme Court has already addressed what role, if any, 
foreign and international law should have in U.S. courts. This debate is 
actually much less threatening and while there may be times where a judge 
is forced to acknowledge a couple’s or individual’s Islamic beliefs when 
interpreting certain civil matters, our laws, the Constitution, and our 
nation’s jurisprudence provides all the guidance our courts should 
require.251 
From a societal standpoint, the anti-Sharia laws are much more 
problematic. Instead of encouraging Muslim-Americans to become active 
members of their community, these laws reinforce the notion that Muslim-
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Americans are to be isolated. Instead of emphasizing the fact that Muslim-
Americans seek the same goals and aspirations as all Americans, these laws 
emphasize that Muslim-Americans are to be feared. These laws run afoul of 
today’s cultural and social currents and they are completely detached from 
what is actually occurring on the ground. In every corner of American 
society, Muslim-Americans have demonstrated just how “American” they 
are. Within our communities, businesses, academic institutions and political 
processes, Muslims and non-Muslims are engaging with one another and 
learning from one another. Going forward, this process must be en-
couraged, not stifled, and any attempts to isolate and segregate Muslim-
Americans must be denounced, not promoted.  
IX. Conclusion 
Professor Geoffrey Stone recently noted:  “[a] time-honored method of 
gaining or consolidating power is to incite public fear, demonize an internal 
‘enemy,’ and then ‘protect’ the public by prosecuting, interning, deporting, 
and spying upon those accused of disloyalty.”252  Sadly, we are seeing a 
similar pattern unfold today. The uproar over Sharia and Muslim-
Americans, however, is completely misplaced. We should not simply focus 
on what is written in the Qu’ran or the sunna and presume that this 
precisely defines Muslim-Americans. On the contrary, we should focus on 
the people these texts are meant to guide. It is easy to look at a document 
that is centuries old and discover ideas or statements that do not translate to 
today. Likewise, it is easy to look at individuals or leaders in distant 
countries and determine that because they share a religion in name, they 
share the same goals and values. One only has to look and interact with 
Muslim-Americans today to realize that such lazy characterizations are 
incorrect. 
Still, anti-Muslim views have grown more common. Recently, on the 
floor of the Tennessee State Assembly, State Senator Rick Womick went 
before his colleagues to warn them of the threat of Islam and Sharia. He 
declared that he had been studying the Qu'ran and determined that Sharia is 
a political, legal, and military doctrine that calls for global jihad and world 
domination. “Folks,” Sen. Womick, said, “this is not what I call ‘Do unto 
others what you’d have them do unto you.’”253 
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Similar warnings are being echoed across the country as elected 
officials and activists mobilize against what they describe as the menace of 
Sharia in the United States. History has taught us that in the midst of 
national crises and threats to our security, such rhetoric can be dangerous. 
Over the next several years, as additional proposals to ban Sharia and 
alienate Muslim-Americans are put forward, it will be essential for the 
government and the public to chart a different course. 
